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 1 Introduction
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) conducted its quantitative easing policy (QEP), with a policy com-
mitment, from March 2001 to March 2006 under the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal
interest rates. The BOJ promised to maintain the QEP until the core CPI in￿ ation rate be-
came stably zero or higher. Moreover, from 2005, the BOJ announced that, after its exit from
the QEP, monetary policy would continue to maintain very low short-term interest rates, with
gradual adjustments in their level in view of economic and ￿nancial developments. Although
this type of policy commitment was unprecedented at that time, other central banks such as
Bank of Canada and Riksbank introduced similar policy commitment in response to the recent
global ￿nancial crisis.1
In this paper, we evaluate the e⁄ects of the BOJ￿ s policy commitment on market partic-
ipants￿interest rate expectations. To this end, we use a rich individual survey source, QSS
(QUICK Survey System), provided by QUICK corporation. The survey asks market partici-
pants about their views on the future course of interest rates and in￿ ation rates. The e⁄ects
of the policy commitment need to be examined against developments in expectations regard-
ing not just interest rates but also in￿ ation rates. In particular, the latter data are valuable,
because otherwise it is di¢ cult to identify whether low interest rate expectations are due to
the policy commitment or simply due to low in￿ ation expectations. In that respect, the QSS
provides useful information to analyze the role of the policy commitment.
Our analysis reveals a kinked relationship between interest rate expectations and in￿ ation
rate expectations at the threshold level of in￿ ation rate expectations, in tune with the necessary
condition for the termination of the QEP. We evaluate the e⁄ects of the policy commitment
on market expectations not just for the timing of the termination of the QEP but also for
the future path of short-term interest rates after the termination of the QEP. Two empirical
￿ndings emerge.
First, when in￿ ation expectations remained below the threshold, interest rate expectations
1In April 2009, Bank of Canada introduced a conditional commitment, stating ￿Conditional on the outlook
for in￿ ation, the target overnight rate can be expected to remain at its current level until the end of the second
quarter of 2010 in order to achieve the in￿ ation target. The Bank will continue to provide such guidance in its
scheduled interest rate announcements as long as the overnight rate is at the e⁄ective lower bound.￿
Riksbank regularly announces their in￿ ation and policy rate forecasts. By showing low levels of in￿ ation and
policy rate forecasts, it helped lower expectations on the future path of interest rates.
Although their commitment is less clear, the Federal Reserve stated ￿the Committee believes that policy
accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period￿ in August 2003. The Federal Reserve also an-
nounced that they would maintain ￿exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for some time (or an
extended period)￿from 2008 to 2011.
1did not respond to changes in in￿ ation rate expectations. Market participants anticipated the
continuation of the QEP and the unchanged low interest rate. The threshold was estimated at
around zero percent for three-month TIBOR and two- and ￿ve-year government bonds. That
level was consistent with the BOJ￿ s policy commitment to continuing the QEP until the CPI
in￿ ation rate became stably zero or higher. For long-term interest rates, the kink was unclear.
Second, when in￿ ation expectations exceeded the threshold, interest rate expectations re-
sponded to in￿ ation rate expectations, but only modestly. Above the threshold, market par-
ticipants anticipated an exit from the QEP and rises in the call rate. At the same time, they
also anticipated that such adjustments in the call rate would be carried out in a very gradual
manner. More precisely, for three-month TIBOR, the estimated size of the jump in the call
rate at the threshold was insigni￿cantly small. In addition, the estimated slope of interest rate
expectations with respect to in￿ ation expectations was smaller than one. Such responses were
consistent with the BOJ￿ s announcement that monetary policy would continue to maintain
very low short-term interest rates for some time after the exit from the QEP. For two- and
￿ve-year government bonds, the estimated size of the jump in the call rate became about 0.2
percent point and signi￿cant, suggesting that market participants took rises in the call rate as
a more likely event over two- to ￿ve-year horizons.
Using di⁄erent samples, we deepen analyses on the e⁄ects of this policy commitment. We
￿nd that market expectations for interest rates during the QEP were lower than those after the
QEP, after controlling the level of in￿ ation expectations. This di⁄erence amounted to about
0.7 percent point for three-month TIBOR. Expectations for interest rates were more closely
linked to expectations for in￿ ation rates during the QEP than after the QEP. That suggests
that market participants paid more attention to the developments in in￿ ation rates during the
QEP, compared with the period after the QEP. Dividing samples during the QEP, we ￿nd
that, as the actual CPI in￿ ation increased to the threshold, market participants became more
mindful of the termination of the QEP, making their expectations for interest rates more closely
linked to expectations for in￿ ation rates. That suggests that the policy commitment e⁄ect on
market expectations becomes stronger as the economy recovers, which is consistent with views
expressed by Shirakawa (2010).2
A number of empirical studies exist regarding the e⁄ects of policy commitment. As for
Japan￿ s QEP, Ugai (2007) provides a survey and concludes that this policy commitment has a
clear e⁄ect on reducing the future path of interest rates at short- to medium-term maturities.3
2Shirakawa (2010) argues ￿the policy duration e⁄ect could exert signi￿cant easing e⁄ects, especially when
economic recovery progresses and corporate pro￿ts improve.￿
3Regarding other aspects in the QEP, Ugai argues, ￿rst, that there were phases in which the increase in
the current account balances held by ￿nancial institutions at the BOJ bolstered people￿ s expectations. Second,
2For example, Baba et al. (2005) develop a macro-￿nance model to calculate the di⁄erence
of the future path of interest rates with and without the policy commitment. The di⁄erence
is as much as 0.4 to 0.5 percent point for three- and ￿ve-year government bonds, suggesting
a reduction in the yield curve by the policy commitment. The di⁄erence is not as large for
ten-year government bonds. Baba et al. (2005) and Oda and Ueda (2007) search for the CPI
in￿ ation threshold that the BOJ judges as necessary to terminate the QEP. They report that
the threshold in￿ ation rate was about one percent; market participants expected that as long
the CPI in￿ ation rate was below one percent, the BOJ would continue its QEP. Those results
are not remote from ours, but the estimated threshold is higher, suggesting longer persistence of
the QEP. Such a di⁄erence is attributed to the identi￿cation of in￿ ation expectations. As stated
above, the low yield curve can arise from low in￿ ation expectations, leading to overestimation
of the e⁄ects of the policy commitment unless we control in￿ ation expectations. Thanks to
the QSS, we overcome such a di¢ culty, and in turn, obtain relatively smaller e⁄ects on the
threshold.
As for the policy commitment by the Bank of Canada, Chehal and Trehan (2009) and He
(2010) report opposing results. Chehal and Trehan (2009) argue that the policy commitment
did not have persistent e⁄ects on interest rates. He (2010) argues that the policy commitment
lowered the interest rate for two-, ￿ve-, and ten-year government bonds, although his result
is not statistically strong. Similar to Japan￿ s existing studies, those two studies use aggregate
variables only. Changes in in￿ ation expectations are not su¢ ciently taken into account to
identify policy e⁄ects.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide the simple model of the policy
commitment and discuss our estimation strategy. In Section 3, we explain the QSS and estimate
the e⁄ects of the policy commitment. In Section 4, we provide concluding remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Overview of the Policy Commitment
Facing the prolonged stagnation following the burst of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s,
the BOJ lowered its policy rates to reach the zero lower bound (ZLB) of nominal interest rates
(Figure 1) and adopted a series of unprecedented policies. Among many, one notable policy
adopted in March 2001 was the QEP. The QEP consists mainly of three pillars (see Ugai [2007]
mixed results exist as to whether expansion of the monetary base and a change in the composition of the BOJ￿ s
balance sheet led to portfolio rebalancing. Third, the QEP created an accommodative environment in terms of
corporate ￿nancing. Fourth, the QEP￿ s e⁄ect on the real economy was limited.
3for details). First, the BOJ changed the main operating target for money market operations
from the uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding current account balances held by
￿nancial institutions at the BOJ. Second, the BOJ increased the amount of outright purchases of
long-term Japanese government bonds, up to a ceiling of the outstanding balance of banknotes
issued.
Third, the BOJ introduced the policy commitment (Table 1), which is the focus of this
paper. The BOJ committed itself to continuing the QEP until the year-on-year rate of change
in the CPI (excluding perishables)4 registered zero percent or higher on a sustainable basis.
In October 2003, the BOJ clari￿ed its commitment by specifying necessary conditions for the
termination of the QEP. In October 2005, when the CPI in￿ ation rate recovered, the BOJ stated
in its semi-annual Outlook for Economic Activity and Price that the course of monetary policy
after the exit from the QEP would be a period of very low short-term interest rates followed
by a gradual adjustment to a level consistent with economic activity and price developments.
In March 2006, the year-on-year CPI in￿ ation rate that was available to the public was
0.5 percent (Figure 2).5 The BOJ then judged that the year-on-year change in the CPI was
expected to remain positive and the conditions laid out in the commitment under the QEP
had been ful￿lled. Consequently, the BOJ ended the QEP. The BOJ, however, did not raise
the uncollateralized overnight call rate immediately, stating that the accommodative monetary
environment ensuing from very low interest rates would probably be maintained for some time.
In July 2006, the BOJ raised the uncollateralized overnight call rate to 0.25 percent.
2.2 Model of the Policy Commitment
We develop the model of the policy commitment by limiting our attention to its e⁄ects on
interest rates. Our model is used to examine whether the policy commitment delayed a rise in
policy rates and lowered the future path of short-term interest rates.
In doing so, we clarify two assumptions associated with relationships between the QEP and
the zero interest rate policy. First, we do not assume that the zero interest rate policy leads to
the QEP. We allow for the possibility that the zero interest rate policy, or more broadly, low
interest rate policy may be implemented without the QEP. Even after the termination of the
QEP, the e⁄ects of the policy commitment possibly remain by maintaining the zero interest rate
policy, delaying a rise in policy rates, and/or in￿ uencing the expected future path of short-term
4In Japan, it is often called the core CPI.
5Until August 2006, the base-year of the CPI was 2000. That CPI statistics indicated a positive in￿ ation
rate, for example, 0.5 percent in March 2006 on a real-time basis. However, when the CPI￿ s base year changed
to 2005 in August 2006, the revised CPI in￿ ation rate fell. For example, the above in￿ ation rate was revised
from 0.5 to -0.1 percent.
4interest rates.
Second, our approach rests on the assumption that the QEP leads to the zero interest rate
policy. This assumption does not always hold in reality. In the wake of the global ￿nancial
crisis that started in 2007, some central banks in advanced economies such as ECB and BOE
conducted a series of unconventional policies by maintaining their policy rates above zero.
That policy becomes possible with the help of the deposit facility that pays interest on excess
reserves. Central banks can raise their policy rates without decreasing quantity target like the
outstanding current account balances. Therefore, the policy commitment to continuing the
QEP does not necessarily suggest that the zero interest rate policy is maintained during that
period. Having said, we believe that our assumption was valid during Japan￿ s QEP period from
2001 to 2006. The deposit facility was not adopted until 2008. Market participants appear to
have believed that the zero interest rate policy would be maintained during the QEP.
2.2.1 Short-Term Interest Rate
We consider a monetary policy rule as
i￿
t = r￿ + ￿￿ + ￿(￿t ￿ ￿￿); (2.1)
where i￿
t represents a latent nominal interest rate, which can take a negative value. In the











without the policy commitment. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between interest rates
and in￿ ation rates.6 The in￿ ation rate at which i￿
t = 0 is given by
￿0 = ￿
r￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
￿
: (2.3)
In Japan￿ s case, if we suppose r￿ = 2%, ￿￿ = 1%, and ￿ = 1:5; we obtain ￿0 = ￿1%: Thus,
even if the in￿ ation rate is negative, the policy rate may be raised from zero.
With the policy commitment, we assume a relationship between interest rates and in￿ ation











6Values ￿ and ￿ in Figures 3 and 4 represent term premiums. They are needed for analyzing long-term
interest rates.
5A variable ￿c indicates the threshold in￿ ation rate. While the in￿ ation rate is below the
threshold, the central bank continues the zero interest rate policy. We assume that the latent
interest rate is positive when the in￿ ation rate equals the threshold:
r￿ + ￿￿ + ￿(￿c
t ￿ ￿￿) > 0: (2.5)
In other words, ￿0 < ￿c; meaning that the policy commitment extends the duration of the






0 if ￿t ￿ ￿c
i￿
t if ￿t > ￿c (2.6)
= I(￿t ￿ ￿c) ￿ i￿
t: (2.7)
I(x) is a function which yields one if x is non-negative and zero otherwise.
As one aspect of the policy commitment, we also consider a downward shift in the monetary
policy rule when ￿t > ￿c. The BOJ emphasized in October 2005 and March 2006 that monetary
policy would continue to maintain very low short-term interest rates for some time after the
exit from the QEP. If that announcement is e⁄ective, it continues to in￿ uence the future
path of short-term interest rates after the QEP. Regarding the monetary policy rule, such an
announcement lowers its intercept r￿ + ￿￿ and make its slope ￿ ￿ atter, as shown in Figure 4.9
2.2.2 Longer-Term Interest Rates
To estimate the model, we use data for longer-term interest rates and in￿ ation expectations.














7A policy inertia, described by the dependence on the lagged interest rate, is another reason for extending
the duration of the zero interest rate policy. In particular, the policy commitment under the ZLB is known to
have history dependence. For example, Reifschneider and Williams (2000) propose the policy rule that responds
to the accumulation of the latent nominal interests that are negative. We, however, do not incorporate this
factor as a benchmark because the BOJ did not o¢ cially commit to the Reifschneider and Williams (2000) type
of rule, and it is empirically di¢ cult to calculate the size of the accumulation of the latent nominal interests if
any. See Section Appendix B for an attempt to consider the policy inertia.
8When setting the interest rate under the policy commitment, the BOJ refers to the current state of in-
￿ ation, but not to the accumulation or the spell of past negative in￿ ation. This mitigates complexity and
time-inconsistency problems intrinsic to the optimal commitment policy. In this respect, the policy commitment
is closer to the one proposed by Ueda (2010) than that by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
9If the in￿ ation rate becomes su¢ ciently high, the policy rate may be raised aggressively, making the slope
￿ steeper and returning to a monetary policy rule in a normal situation.

















I(Et￿t+j ￿ ￿c) ￿ fr￿ + ￿￿ + ￿(Et￿t+j ￿ ￿￿)g: (2.10)


























I(Et￿t+j ￿ ￿c) ￿ f￿ + ￿(Et￿t+j ￿ ￿c)g; (2.11)
where
￿ = ￿ + r￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿c): (2.12)
Due to assumption (2.5), we require
￿ > ￿: (2.13)
In sum, the e⁄ects of the policy commitment are evaluated by three variables: ￿c; ￿ ￿ ￿;
and ￿: The threshold in￿ ation rate ￿c captures a necessary condition for the termination of
the QEP. A higher ￿c suggests a tougher necessary condition. The intercept di⁄erence ￿ ￿ ￿
and the slope ￿ determines the future path of short-term interest rates after the termination
of the QEP. Both a lower ￿ ￿ ￿ and a lower ￿ suggest that the BOJ raises the policy rate less
aggressively in response to an increase in in￿ ation rates.
2.2.3 Estimation Strategy
We regress equation (2.11) to examine the e⁄ects of the policy commitment. In doing so, we
use the QSS. As we will explain below, from the QSS, we know only the following data on
in￿ ation expectations: Et￿t+12; Et￿t+24; and Et￿t+120: In addition, we use the real-time based
in￿ ation rate ￿t; t being available at the time when the survey is conducted. From the four
series, we linearly interpolate in￿ ation expectations over other horizons:
Et￿t+m =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
f(12 ￿ m)￿t + mEt￿t+12g=12 for 1 ￿ m ￿ 12
f(24 ￿ m)Et￿t+12 + (m ￿ 12)Et￿t+24g=12 for 13 ￿ m ￿ 24
f(120 ￿ m)Et￿t+24 + (m ￿ 24)Et￿t+120g=96 for 25 ￿ m ￿ 120
Et￿t+120 for 121 ￿ m
: (2.14)
7By regressing EtiT
t+k using explanatory variables of Et￿t+m; we can estimate ￿c; ￿; ￿;and ￿:
We estimate ￿; ￿;and ￿ by OLS with ￿c ￿xed, and employ a grid-search method for ￿c so as
to maximize the likelihood function.
3 Estimation
3.1 QSS Data
We use the QSS (QUICK Survey System) provided by QUICK corp. The QSS is a survey
about market participants￿sentiments. From July 1996, it asks market participants monthly
about their views on equity and bond markets and the real economy. Respondents include
market participants from securities ￿rms, banks, investment trusts, insurance ￿rms, pension
funds, and other private ￿nancial institutions. The QSS is an unbalanced panel with about
150 respondents per month.
Among many survey items, we focus on surveys on expectations for interest rates and
in￿ ation rates (see Table 2). As for interest rates, we use TIBOR three months and newly
issued government bonds at the maturity of two, ￿ve, ten, and twenty years. For each, one-,
three-, and six-month ahead expectations for the interest rates are available. In￿ ation rates
are expressed by the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI (excluding perishables). For each,
average in￿ ation expectations over next one, two, and ten years are available. The survey on
in￿ ation rates started in July 2004, so we are unable to analyze the e⁄ects of the adoption of
QEP in 2001 on in￿ ation expectations.
Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2 provide the basic statistics and movements of actual or ex-
pected interest rates and in￿ ation rates. Under the QEP, in￿ ation expectations rose steadily in
accordance with actual in￿ ation (Figure 2). That resulted in the rise in actual interest rates,
as the QEP came closer to ending (Figure 1). See Appendix A for details.
3.2 Nonparametric Perspective on the Policy Commitment
3.2.1 Period under the QEP
We begin with providing a graphical presentation on the e⁄ects of the policy commitment.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between interest rate expectations and in￿ ation expectations
under the QEP. The sample period is from July 2004 to February 2006; the initial period
is the month when the survey on in￿ ation rates started; and the end period is one month
before the termination of the QEP. Each dot indicates a respondent￿ s expectation at a certain
month. We plot interest rate expectations over three-month horizons, because those over one-
8and six-month horizons are similar. Five panels show interest rate expectations for three-
month TIBOR, two-, ￿ve-, ten-, and twenty-year government bonds. The horizon of in￿ ation
expectations is one year.10 A solid line indicates the mean of interest rate expectations obtained
from a nonparametric kernel smoothing regression, with its asymptotic variability bounds being
indicated by dashed lines.11
We ￿nd a kinked relationship between interest rate expectations and in￿ ation expectations.
In particular, for three-month TIBOR and two- and ￿ve-year government bonds, the presence
of the kink is clear at the threshold of in￿ ation expectations around zero percent. The kinked
relationship resembles that in Figure 4. For long-term interest rates, the kink is unclear.
When in￿ ation expectations remain below the threshold, the slope of interest rate expecta-
tions is ￿ at. That suggests that market participants anticipated the continuation of the QEP
and the unchanged low interest rate. Such a response is consistent with the BOJ￿ s policy
commitment to continuing the QEP until the CPI in￿ ation rate became stably zero or higher.
When in￿ ation expectations exceed the threshold, the slope becomes gently positive. Al-
though increases in interest rate expectations are accompanied by increases in in￿ ation expec-
tations, such increases in interest rate expectations are gradual, in particular, for three-month
TIBOR. Such a response is consistent with the BOJ￿ s announcement that monetary policy
would continue to maintain very low short-term interest rates for some time after the exit from
the QEP.
3.2.2 Dependence on Sample Periods
For comparison, we next investigate changes in expectations during and after the QEP. First,
we divide the sample period of the QEP into two. In Figure 6, the middle period of the QEP
is from July 2004 to June 2005, denoted by a circle (o), and the latter period is from July 2005
to June 2006, denoted by a plus (+). As for the latter period, we extend the sample period
until June 2006 instead of February 2006 to ensure enough samples. From March to July in
2006, the BOJ ended the QEP but maintained to target almost the zero interest rate.
Comparing the two periods, we ￿nd two things. First, the dots in the ￿gure move to the
right, suggesting an increase in in￿ ation expectations. This is accompanied by the increase in
the actual CPI in￿ ation rate. Second, interest rate expectations for three-month TIBOR and
two-year government bonds are higher and steeper in the latter period than those in the middle
period. That implies that as the actual CPI in￿ ation rate increased to the threhold, market
10Figures A-7 and A-8 show in￿ ation rate expectations over two- and ten-year forecast horizons.
11We use R to employ the nonparametric kernel smoothing regression. The Nadaraya-Watson method is
applied. The band width is chosen by least-squares cross-validation, and the kernel type is continuous second-
order Gaussian.
9participants became more mindful of the end of the QEP. For ten-year government bonds, there
was almost no change.
We next plot interest rate expectations vis-a-vis in￿ ation expectations after the QEP ended.
Figure 7 shows interest rate expectations vis-a-vis in￿ ation expectations. Considering that the
BOJ raised the call rate from almost zero to 0.25 percent in July 2006, we use the sample after
August 2006. The sample ends in November 2008, so it includes the time of the global ￿nancial
turmoil. Note that the BOJ did not introduce the policy commitment during that time. To
highlight the di⁄erences between two policy regimes, Figure 8 plots their means obtained from
a kernel smoothing regression with those during the QEP. Upper and lower lines represent the
means during and after the QEP, respectively, with their asymptotic variability bounds being
indicated by dashed lines.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate mainly two things. First, at short- to medium-term maturities,
we ￿nd that interest rate expectations after the QEP ended are higher than those during the
QEP, after controlling the level of in￿ ation expectations. Their di⁄erence indicates the size of
the policy commitment e⁄ect on interest rates.12 For three-month TIBOR, it amounts to about
0.7 percent point. For two-year government bonds, it amounts to about 0.5 percent point. In
both cases, di⁄erences appear to be signi￿cant. As the maturity lengthens, their di⁄erence
becomes smaller and insigni￿cant.
Second, after the QEP ended, interest rate expectations are more broadly scattered. Their
dependence on the in￿ ation rate is weaker, and no clear kink is observed at all maturities.
Those di⁄erences highlight the e⁄ects of the policy commitment that conditioned its policy on
the developments in the CPI in￿ ation rate.
3.3 Estimation Results
So far we have examined the e⁄ects of the policy commitment graphically. In this subsection,
we analyze the e⁄ects quantitatively by estimating the model.
3.3.1 Benchmark
We regress equation (2.11) to examine the e⁄ects of the policy commitment. As for explanatory
variables, we use not only in￿ ation expectations over three di⁄erent forecast horizons (one, two,
12In order to gauge the policy e⁄ect by the di⁄erence in the interest rate, two conditions need to be satis￿ed.
First, the e⁄ects of the policy commitment are completely dispelled in the post period. Second, macroeconomic
situations other than in￿ ation are the same between the two periods. Importantly, tradeo⁄ exists between those
two conditions. Here we attempt to meet the ￿rst condition by using a su¢ ciently long sample after the QEP,
but it sacri￿ces the second condition. See Appendix B for another approach using short samples during and
after the QEP.
10and ten years) but also the actual in￿ ation rate. This is because, as equation (2.14) shows, we
need to match the time horizon of interest rates with that of the in￿ ation rates. Regarding the
actual in￿ ation rate, we use the real-time year-on-year CPI (excluding perishables) in￿ ation
rate that was available to market participants at the time of survey. We search for ￿c using a
grid of 0.01 percent point so that it maximizes the likelihood function. The sample period is
from July 2004 to February 2006. There are about 3,000 samples. Table 4 reports the estimated
coe¢ cients of ￿c; ￿; ￿;and ￿; with adjusted R2.
We employ simple pooled regression. We do not control ￿xed nor random e⁄ects associated
with panel data. We do not use the Tobit model, either. We choose to do so for the following
reasons. First, observed interest rates are not strictly zero due to a term premium. The term
premium may di⁄er across market participants. The standard Tobit model is thus not applied.
Second, when regressing qualitative dependent variable using a panel data, an incidental pa-
rameter problem arises. That problem has been long pointed out by, for example, Neyman
and Schott (1948), Honore (1992), and Lancaster (2000). It states that a ￿xed e⁄ect is hard
to separate from the threshold that determines a kink in the dependent variable. For those
reasons, we employ simple pooled regression as a benchmark and check the robustness of our
results by using a modi￿ed Tobit model and a subset of samples.13
Estimation results in Table 4 are in line with the theory of the policy commitment dis-
cussed in Section 2.2. We begin with examining three-month TIBOR. Regarding the threshold
in￿ ation rate for the policy commitment ￿c, we obtain its estimate around zero percent. That
coincides with the necessary condition for the termination of the QEP: under the QEP, the
BOJ committed to maintaining the QEP until the CPI in￿ ation rate became stably zero or
higher. Regarding the rise in the call rate at the threshold, the estimated di⁄erence between ￿
and ￿ is small and insigni￿cant. Regarding the pace of interest rate rises, the estimated slope
of the Taylor rule ￿ is signi￿cantly positive and smaller than one. The last two results suggest
that the policy commitment not just delayed the timing of the termination of the QEP but also
reduced expectations for the future path of short-term interest rates after the termination of
the QEP. Those results coincide with the BOJ￿ s policy commitment to maintaining an accom-
modative monetary environment for some time even after the QEP.14 Regarding the goodness
13See Appendix B for details.
14Several other reasons are considered as to why ￿ is less than one. First, the zero lower bound may have
caused a downward bias in our estimates. Second, other economic varibles, which are not available in the survey,
may have caused a bias in estimates. Third, the e⁄ects of uncertainty may not be adequately incorporated as
in the macro-￿nance model. Fourth, policy inertia may have led to a slow response to a change in in￿ ation,
thereby yielding a low ￿: This last possibility is strongly related to the BOJ￿ s commitment and is examined in
Appendix B.
11of ￿t, adjusted R2 is about 0.2 to 0.3.
We next examine medium-term interest rates at two- and ￿ve-year maturities. The thresh-
old in￿ ation rate ￿c is around 0.1 percent. The slope ￿ is about 0.2, which is signi￿cantly
positive and smaller than one. Such results are similar to those for three-month TIBOR. One
notable di⁄erence is that the intercept ￿ is signi￿cantly larger than ￿ by about 0.2 percent
point. That implies that, as the forecast horizon lengthens, market participants took rises in
the policy rate as a more likely event even though the level of in￿ ation expectations stayed
unchanged. Adjusted R2 is the highest for two-year government bonds, reaching 0.4.
As for long-term interest rates, we ￿nd similar but weaker results. Adjusted R2 does not
exceed 0.1. One reason is that over a long time horizon, market participants attach greater
importance to other variables than to the CPI in￿ ation rate. For example, forecasts about
￿scal de￿cits and the steady-state real interest rate play a more important role. Consequently,
market participants do not devote serious e⁄ort to forecast about long-term in￿ ation rates. On
the BOJ￿ s side, weak relationships between interest rate expectations and in￿ ation expectations
may be explained by the fact that the time horizon of the BOJ￿ s forecast is at most over next
two years and that the terms of o¢ ce is ￿ve years for the members of the policy board.
3.3.2 Dependence on Sample Periods
Table 5 reports estimation results for varying sample periods. The middle period is from July
2004 to June 2005, the latter period is from July 2005 to June 2006, and the post period is from
August 2006 to November 2008. We focus on three-month forecasts of interest rates, because
results are similar for one and six-month forecasts of interest rates.
Comparing with the middle and the latter periods, we ￿nd that the goodness of ￿t is far
better in the latter period than in the middle period. For three-month TIBOR, adjusted R2 is
0.54 in the latter period while it falls to 0.01 in the middle period. In the latter period, most
parameter estimates are consistent with the theory, yielding ￿ > ￿ > 0 and 0 < ￿ < 1: For
three-month TIBOR, a di⁄erence between ￿ and ￿ is as small as 0.06 percent point, and ￿ is 0.5.
The threshold in￿ ation rate ￿c is about 0.1 percent for three-month TIBOR and 0.3 percent
for two- and ￿ve-year government bonds. Some parameter estimates in the middle period
are inconsistent with theory prediction. The estimated ￿ is negative for two-year government
bonds.
Those di⁄erences between the middle and latter periods are explained by the di⁄erence of
actual in￿ ation rates, and in turn, the di⁄erence of market participants￿attitudes in forming
their expectations. In the middle period, the actual CPI in￿ ation rate remained su¢ ciently
below a threshold. The necessary condition for the end of the QEP was not satis￿ed at that
12time, and market participants did not anticipate the end of the QEP in the near future. There-
fore, market participants did not need to pay much attention to in￿ ation outlook in order to
forecast interest rates. That made the relationship between in￿ ation and interest rates am-
biguous. However, in the latter period, the actual CPI in￿ ation increased to the threshold.
The market participants began to prepare for the end of the QEP. They started to monitor
actual in￿ ation and forecast in￿ ation carefully to forecast interest rates. That led to a clearer
relationship between in￿ ation and interest rates, and in turn, the better ￿t of the model in
the latter period than in the middle period. Those results suggest that the policy commitment
e⁄ect on market expectations becomes stronger as the economy recovers, which is consistent
with views expressed by Shirakawa (2010).15
Regarding the post period, we ￿nd that the goodness of ￿t in the post period is worse
than that during the QEP. Adjusted R2 declines, ￿ is lower than ￿ for short to medium-term
bonds, and ￿ is negative for medium-term bonds. That re￿ ects the obvious fact that the policy
commitment was not implemented in the post period. In addition, the lower performance in
the post period suggests that monetary policy was less responsive to CPI in￿ ation, because the
BOJ no longer employed the policy commitment that referred to the CPI.
Comparisons of ￿(￿) between the benchmark and the post period give us a clue about the
size of the policy commitment e⁄ect. For three-month TIBOR, its di⁄erence amounts to 0.8
(0.6) percent point. For two-year government bonds, its di⁄erence amounts to 0.8 (0.5) percent
point. Other things being equal, we can interpret that those di⁄erences indicate the size of the
interest rate reduction by the policy commitment.16
4 Concluding Remarks
Using the survey on interest rate and in￿ ation expectations, we have evaluated the e⁄ects of the
BOJ￿ s policy commitment on market expectations. This survey is valuable, because otherwise it
is di¢ cult to identify whether low interest rate expectations are due to the policy commitment
or simply due to low in￿ ation expectations. Our analysis has revealed a kinked relationship
between interest rate expectations and in￿ ation rate expectations at the threshold level of
in￿ ation expectations at zero percent, in tune with the necessary condition for the termination
of the QEP. In addition, even when in￿ ation expectations exceeded the threshold, interest rate
15Shirakawa (2010) argues ￿the policy duration e⁄ect could exert signi￿cant easing e⁄ects, especially when
economic recovery progresses and corporate pro￿ts improve.￿
16Of course, macroeconomic situations are very di⁄erent between the two samples. For example, oil and
commodity prices jumped, and the subprime mortgage problem occurred in the post period. We conduct a
robustness check in Appendix B.
13expectations responded only gradually to in￿ ation rate expectations. Those results indicate
the importance of evaluating the e⁄ects of the policy commitment on market expectations not
just for the timing of the termination of the QEP but also for the future path of short-term
interest rates after the termination of the QEP.
The future work needs to be extended mainly in three directions. The ￿rst concerns impli-
cations for the real economy in a general equilibrium context. In this paper, we have treated
in￿ ation expectations as an explanatory variable and analyzed the e⁄ects of the policy com-
mitment on market participants￿interest rate expectations. This approach is not exempt from
the endogeneity problem in that the policy commitment is considered to in￿ uence in￿ ation ex-
pectations by lowering interest rate expectations. Moreover, we have not considered the e⁄ects
of the policy commitment on real economic activity and actual in￿ ation rates.17 We need a
general equilibrium framework to analyze those e⁄ects with a theoretical model of the policy
commitment.
Second, we need to pay more attention to the central bank￿ s balance sheet. On a liability
side, the current account balances held by ￿nancial institutions at the BOJ served as the o¢ cial
target under the QEP. The target level increased step by step from ￿ve trillion yen in March
2001 to the band of 30 to 35 trillion yen in March 2006 (see Figure 9). On an asset side, the
BOJ￿ s balance sheet changed its composition. The BOJ increased the amount of the outright
purchase of long-term Japanese government bonds. From July 2003 to March 2006, the BOJ
purchased asset-backed securities. Those balance-sheet policies may have in￿ uenced ￿nancial
markets and the real economy. For example, there is a possibility that the accumulation of the
current account balances up to 35 trillion yen made market participants believe that excess
reserves would be adjusted only gradually, reducing market expectations for the future path of
short-term interest rates at the ￿nal stage of the QEP. To investigate the e⁄ects of balance-sheet
policies thoroughly, the survey data on in￿ ation expectations provided limited information. Its
survey started after the target level reached the band of 30 to 35 trillion yen, and while the
survey was conducted, the target level of current account balances stayed unchanged until the
QEP ended. Nevertheless, research in that direction is clearly needed.
Third, similar assessments need to be applied to other advanced countries. In the wake of the
recent ￿nancial crisis, central banks introduced various unconventional policies. In particular,
as for policy commitment, Bank of Canada adopted an explicit conditional commitment. The
Federal Reserve announced that they would maintain exceptionally low levels for the federal
funds rate for some time. The Bank of England did not introduce explicit policy commitment.
17For example, the recent work by Nakajima, Shiratsuka, and Teranishi (2010) employs a time-varying VAR
model to analyze the e⁄ects of the policy commitment on output and prices.
14The European Central Bank did not conduct explicit policy commitment, but introduced the
￿xed-rate, full-allotment operation at the maturity of one year. It is interesting to see whether
we can observe a similar kinked relationship between interest rate expectations and in￿ ation
rate expectations.
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17Table 1: BOJ￿ s policy commitment
Date Policy
Mar. 19, 2001
Committing that the QEP continues to be in place
until the CPI (excluding perishables) in￿ ation registers stably
a zero percent or an increase year on year.
Oct. 10, 2003
Enhancing monetary policy transparency.
BOJ￿ s commitment is underpinned by the following two conditions.
1. it requires not only that the most recently published core CPI
should register a zero percent or above, but also that such tendency
should be con￿rmed over a few months.
2. the BOJ needs to be convinced that the prospective CPI
in￿ ation will not be expected to register below a zero percent.
The above conditions are the necessary condition. There may be cases,
however, that the BOJ will judge it appropriate to continue with
the QEP even if these two conditions are ful￿lled.
Oct 31, 2005
Release of Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices.
The possibility of a departure from the present monetary policy framework
is likely to increase over the course of ￿scal 2006.
The course of monetary policy after the change of the framework will be
a period of very low short-term interest rates followed by a gradual adjustment
to a level consistent with economic activity and price developments.
Mar. 9, 2006
Exit from the QEP by changing the operating target to the
uncollateralized overnight call rate.
Encouraging the uncollateralized overnight call rate to remain
at e⁄ectively zero percent.
As for the future interest rate, the BOJ states that
an accommodative monetary environment ensuing from very low interest rates
will probably be maintained for some time.
Jul. 14, 2006
Encouraging the uncollateralized overnight call rate to remain
at around 0.25 percent.
18Table 2: Questionnaires in the QSS
Item Time horizon of forecast Period
TIBOR rate (3 months) 1, 3, 6 months 2000M5 ￿2008M11
Newly issued JGB rate (2 years) 1, 3, 6 months 2001M5 ￿2008M11
Newly issued JGB rate (5 years) 1, 3, 6 months 2001M5 ￿2008M11
Newly issued JGB rate (10 years) 1, 3, 6 months 1998M7 ￿2008M11
Newly issued JGB rate (20 years) 1, 3, 6 months 2003M4 ￿2008M11
CPI (excluding perishable) in￿ ation Average of 1, 2, 10 years 2004M7 ￿2008M11
Note: JGB represents Japanese government bonds.
Table 3: Basic statistics













































Note: Upper and lower numbers in parenthesis indicate the means and the standard deviation, respec-
tively.
19Table 4: Estimation results (benchmark)
dependent
variables
#N ￿ S.E. ￿ S.E. ￿ S.E. ￿c Adj R2
1M 2,566 0.089 0.000 0.092 0.002 0.189 0.018 0.02 0.193
TIBOR 3M 2,566 0.093 0.001 0.095 0.002 0.249 0.013 -0.04 0.256
6M 2,565 0.100 0.001 0.134 0.003 0.192 0.018 0.01 0.270
1M 2,915 0.111 0.002 0.255 0.005 0.159 0.020 0.10 0.422
2Y 3M 2,874 0.118 0.003 0.287 0.005 0.153 0.020 0.10 0.413
6M 2,852 0.137 0.004 0.299 0.006 0.170 0.019 0.10 0.350
1M 2,952 0.527 0.009 0.683 0.008 0.209 0.018 0.06 0.197
5Y 3M 2,953 0.551 0.009 0.757 0.008 0.206 0.018 0.09 0.232
6M 2,933 0.622 0.009 0.849 0.009 0.181 0.020 0.15 0.233
1M 2,964 1.322 0.026 1.434 0.007 0.066 0.009 -0.11 0.035
10Y 3M 2,966 1.447 0.008 1.562 0.008 0.054 0.013 0.29 0.065
6M 2,947 1.499 0.009 1.666 0.009 0.049 0.015 0.34 0.094
1M 2,926 1.930 0.045 2.055 0.006 0.026 0.006 -0.20 0.012
20Y 3M 2,925 1.896 0.051 2.104 0.007 0.051 0.006 -0.20 0.035
6M 2,905 2.168 0.006 2.254 0.008 0.047 0.011 0.50 0.060
Note: #N indicates the number of sample. The sample period is July 2004 to February 2006.
20Table 5: Changes in parameters for di⁄ering samples
￿ ￿
Benchmark Middle Latter Post Benchmark Middle Latter Post
TIBOR 0.093 0.088 0.108 0.852 0.095 0.092 0.114 0.680
2Y 0.118 0.136 0.194 0.958 0.287 0.197 0.563 0.763
5Y 0.551 0.547 0.666 1.290 0.757 0.623 1.069 1.243
10Y 1.447 1.265 1.428 1.713 1.562 1.465 1.728 1.703
20Y 1.896 1.869 2.099 2.113 2.104 2.086 2.197 2.202
￿ ￿c
Benchmark Middle Latter Post Benchmark Middle Latter Post
TIBOR 0.249 0.008 0.478 0.083 -0.040 -0.230 0.090 0.100
2Y 0.153 -0.055 0.440 -0.014 0.100 0.210 0.280 0.400
5Y 0.206 0.101 0.382 -0.105 0.090 -0.200 0.300 0.400
10Y 0.054 0.082 0.124 -0.059 0.290 -0.200 0.400 0.480
20Y 0.051 0.073 0.050 0.012 -0.200 -0.200 0.490 0.220
Adj R2
Benchmark Middle Latter Post
TIBOR 0.256 0.013 0.538 0.213
2Y 0.413 0.043 0.616 0.185
5Y 0.232 0.042 0.439 0.052
10Y 0.065 0.039 0.266 0.019
20Y 0.035 0.049 0.075 0.009
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Figure 4: Monetary policy with the ZLB and the policy commitment










































































































Figure 5: Interest rate expectations vis-a-vis one-year in￿ ation expectations
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Figure 6: Interest rate expectations vis-a-vis one-year in￿ ation expectations in the middle and
latter period of the QEP













































































































Figure 7: Interest rate expectations vis-a-vis one-year in￿ ation expectations after the QEP
ended

















































































































































































































Figure 8: Interest rate expectations vis-a-vis one-year in￿ ation expectations during and after
the QEP















Figure 9: Current account balances
Source: Bank of Japan
28Appendix
A QSS Data
In this Appendix, we report the data in the QSS in more details. We plot the mean, the ratio
of the standard deviation to the mean, and the skewness with the CPI in￿ ation rate. A shaded
area indicates the period of the QEP.
A.1 Interest Rate Expectations
Figures A-1 to A-5 plot interest rate expectations. As for the mean of interest rate expectations,
short- to medium-term bond interest rates were low and stable under the QEP. Some months
before the exit from the policy, those interest rates picked up gradually. Long-term bond
interest rates were relatively high and unstable.
We next examine the variation of interest rate expectations in view of the ratio of the
standard deviation to the mean. We do not look at a simple standard deviation, because
the standard deviation obviously decreases due to the decrease in the level of the interest
rate under the QEP. According to this measure, the variation of the short to medium-term
bond interest rates decreased slowly under the QEP. That implies that the policy commitment
lowered the level of short to medium-term bond interest rates on impact, but stabilized them
over time. It is considered to re￿ ect the gradual propagation of the policy commitment among
market participants. Or it is considered to re￿ ect regained stability of ￿nancial markets and
the ￿nancial system. A few months before the exit from the QEP, the variation of three-month
TIBOR interest rates started to increase.
The skewness of interest rate expectations for short- to medium-term bond interest rates
was positive in most of the periods under the QEP. That suggests that some market participants
expected very high interest rates, but the ZLB prevented them from expecting negative interest
rates. The skewness of interest rate expectations for long-term bond interest rates was nearly
zero. That suggests symmetric expectations at those maturities.
A.2 In￿ ation Expectations
Figure A-6 plots in￿ ation expectations. As for the mean of in￿ ation expectations, we ￿nd four
things. First, in￿ ation expectations over next one- and two-year horizons increased steadily
from 2004 to 2006. That movement was correlated with that in the actual CPI. Second, over
the one-year horizon, market participants expected the positive in￿ ation rate in mid-2005, one
year earlier than the exit in March 2006. Over the two-year horizon, in￿ ation expectations
29were positive when the survey started in mid-2004. Third, ten-year in￿ ation expectations were
stable over the entire sample periods. Its mean was 1.1 percent, which is in the range of the
understanding of medium to long-term price stability clari￿ed by the policy board at the BOJ:
between zero to two percent with median ￿gure around one percent. Fourth, from the end
of 2007, in￿ ation expectations rose, re￿ ecting the wake of the ￿nancial crisis and the surge in
commodity prices.
The middle panel plots the standard deviation of in￿ ation expectations. Since the mean of
in￿ ation expectations ￿ uctuates around zero, unlike previous ￿gures, we do not plot the ratio
of the standard deviation to the mean. The standard deviation was stable during the QEP. It
then increased from 2007.
The skewness of in￿ ation expectations was positive in most of the periods. That suggests
that some market participants expected very high in￿ ation rates.
A.3 Relationship between Interest Rate Expectations and In￿ ation Expec-
tations
Figures A-7 and A-8 show a relationship between interest rate expectations and in￿ ation ex-
pectations. As for in￿ ation expectations, we used one-year in￿ ation rate expectations to plot
Figure 5. Here, we use two- and ten-year in￿ ation expectations.
Those ￿gures suggest an ambiguous relationship between interest rate expectations and
in￿ ation expectations for longer-term in￿ ation expectations.
B Robustness Checks
In this appendix, we check the robustness of our results.
B.1 Model without the Policy Commitment
First, we examine how the monetary policy rule is estimated if we do not introduce the model
without the policy commitment. By this, we mean the policy without the threshold in￿ ation
rate ￿c. Under the policy, the timing of the termination of the QEP is not delayed. Note,
however, that the policy still plays a role in reducing the future path of short-term interest
rates after the termination of the QEP by having ￿ ￿ ￿ and small ￿.
The expected interest rate in the model without the policy commitment corresponds to
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r￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
￿
< ￿c: (B.2)
Equation (2.12) suggests that equation (B.1) is equivalent to equation (2.11) with
￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿(￿c ￿ ￿0): (B.3)
Table B-1 reports results when we estimate equation (B.1). It suggests the validity of the
policy commitment model. The performance of the model without the policy commitment is
poorer than that of the model with the policy commitment. Adjusted R2 is signi￿cantly lower
at all the maturities except for three-month TIBOR. For example, for two-year government
bonds, adjusted R2 is 0.35 while it is 0.41 in the model with the policy commitment. The table
also suggests that, without consideration of the policy commitment, we tend to ￿nd weaker
commitment e⁄ects. Estimates reveal that ￿0 is lower than or at most equal to ￿c: For two-year
government bonds, the di⁄erence of in￿ ation rates, ￿c￿￿0; is 0.15 percent point. By that size,
the policy commitment makes the continuation of the QEP more probable.
Signi￿cant model di⁄erences are not observed for three-month TIBOR. However, as is stated
above, that does not imply that the policy commitment was ine⁄ective. Rather, that re￿ ects
the fact that the e⁄ects of the policy commitment continued to remain even after the end of
the QEP. The call rate did not jump at the threshold in￿ ation rate, making estimated ￿ and
￿ almost the same.
B.2 Sample Period
In the main text of this paper, we compare estimates between the benchmark period and the
post period to evaluate the e⁄ects of the policy commitment. However, those estimates may
not be comparable, because macroeconomic circumstances may greatly di⁄er. The post period
includes the recent episode of the ￿nancial crisis, when GDP dropped, unemployment rose, and
￿nancial markets and the ￿nancial system were destabilized. The post period also includes the
time when oil and food prices soared. Over the long sample, the equilibrium real interest and
in￿ ation rates are subject to changes.
In this appendix, we compare shorter sample periods just before and just after the QEP
ended. By comparing graphs and estimates, we attempt to control changes in macroeconomic
circumstances.
31Before showing results, let us emphasize one drawback of this approach. Even though the
QEP ended in March 2006, it does not mean that the policy commitment ended. Before and
when the QEP ended, the BOJ stated that it would maintain the low interest rate environment
for some time. That statement is considered to have reduced interest rate expectations after
the QEP ended. Therefore, comparing estimates from shorter sample periods just before and
just after the QEP ended has the risk of underestimating the size of the policy commitment.
Figure B-1 demonstrates the interest rate expectations vis-a-vis in￿ ation expectations for
di⁄ering three sample periods: from December 2005 to February 2006, just before the QEP
ended, denoted by a blue circle (o); from April 2006 to June 2006, when the QEP ended but
the zero interest rate policy was maintained, denoted by a red dot (￿); and from August 2006
to October 2006, just after the Bank of Japan raised its policy rate to 0.25 percent, denoted
by a green plus (+). The ￿gure generally shows a positive slope: an increase in interest rate
expectations is accompanied with an increase in in￿ ation expectations. The increase in interest
rate expectations is distinct for three-month TIBOR, re￿ ecting the actual rise in the call rate.
We then estimate parameters using samples from December 2005 to February 2006 together
with those from August 2006 to October 2006. The interim period from March 2006 to August
2006 is omitted from the sample. Since the sample periods include the periods when the QEP
was and was not conducted, we need to use two distinct models. For the former period, we
estimate the model of the policy commitment given by equation (2.11). For the latter period,
we estimate the model without the policy commitment given by equation (B.1), although the
e⁄ects of the policy commitment are considered to have remained as we stated in the above. In
estimating the model, we employ a grid-search method with both ￿c and ￿0 in the range of ￿ 1.0
to 0.5 percent. For each ￿c and ￿0, we estimate ￿ and ￿ by restricting ￿ = (￿ ￿ ￿)=(￿c ￿ ￿0)
from equation (B.3).
Table B-2 reports estimation results. Compared with Table 4, we ￿nd some di⁄erences,
re￿ ecting the rise in the policy rate in July 2006. Estimates ￿ and ￿ increase at all maturities.
A di⁄erence of ￿ from ￿ widens signi￿cantly for three-month TIBOR. Slightly dissatisfactory
results are the estimate of the threshold in￿ ation rate ￿c: Except for three-month TIBOR, the
estimated threshold reaches 0.5 percent, the upper bound of grid search.18 Having said, we
still ￿nd a di⁄erence between ￿cand ￿0a useful indicator for the size of the policy commitment.
The theory implies that the policy rate is raised at ￿0 without the policy commitment, but
that rise is delayed by ￿c ￿ ￿0due to the policy commitment. For three-month TIBOR, the
di⁄erence amounts to 0.8 percent point.
18We do not show here, but when we extend the upper bound to one percent, the estimated threshold reaches
one percent.
32B.3 In￿ ation Data
We next examine the e⁄ects of food and energy price changes. So far, we have focused the CPI
excluding perishables, because that is the price index that the BOJ referred to during the QEP.
The CPI includes food and energy prices, which are known to be volatile and transitory. One
example is from 2007 to 2008, when global food and energy prices soared but soon dropped.
In that respect, the CPI excluding food and energy serves as a good indicator for monetary
policy decisions. Data on in￿ ation expectations based on the CPI excluding food and energy
are, however, not directly available. We thus calculate them by deducting the di⁄erence of
actual in￿ ation rates between the CPI excluding perishables and the CPI excluding food and
energy from the data on in￿ ation expectations.
Figures B-2 and B-3 plot interest rate expectations vis-a-vis in￿ ation expectations under
the QEP and after its exit, respectively. Compared with previous Figures 5 and 7, which were
based on raw data on in￿ ation expectations, di⁄erences are small. Quantitatively, however,
Table B-3 reveals that the ￿t of the model worsens for the QEP period. For example, for two-
year government bonds, adjusted R2 decreases from 0.41 to 0.18. This result is consistent with
the BOJ￿ s announcement during the QEP, conditioning its policy on not the CPI excluding
food and energy but the CPI excluding perishables. In the post period, changes in the ￿t of the
model are mixed. At three-month and two-year maturities, adjusted R2 decreases; at longer
maturities, adjusted R2 increases.
B.4 Model Speci￿cation
Next, we check robustness to model speci￿cation. We estimate four di⁄erent models: (i) a
simple model without a term structure consideration, (ii) a modi￿ed Tobit model, (iii) a model
with policy inertia, and (iv) a model with the restriction of ￿ = 1:1.
Model without Term Structure First, we estimate a simpler model than the benchmark
by neglecting term structure. In the benchmark regression, we have matched time horizon
between the expected interest rate as a dependent variable and the expected in￿ ation rate as an
independent variable. To this end, we have constructed an independent variable by combining
in￿ ation expectations data over di⁄erent time horizons. However, in￿ ation expectations over
di⁄erent time horizons are likely to obey di⁄erent stochastic processes with di⁄erent means and
variances. That may cause a bias in our estimates. To examine robustness, in the regression
here, we do not match time horizon between the expected interest rate as a dependent variable
and the expected in￿ ation rate as an independent variable. For the independent variable,
we simply use directly available in￿ ation expectations data: one-, two-, or ten-year in￿ ation
33expectations. We estimate the following simple model:
EtiT
t+k = ￿f1 ￿ I(Et￿t+j ￿ ￿c)g
+ I(Et￿t+j ￿ ￿c) ￿ f￿ + ￿(Et￿t+j ￿ ￿c)g: (B.4)
Table B-4 reveals that one-year in￿ ation expectations are a good indicator for interest
rate expectations. When using one-year in￿ ation expectations as an explanatory variable, the
results are very close to those we obtained in the benchmark estimation. When using in￿ ation
expectations over longer time horizon, the goodness of ￿t worsens. That suggests that when
market participants forecast interest rates, they weigh their one-year in￿ ation expectations
rather than longer term in￿ ation expectations.
Modi￿ed Tobit Model Second, we estimate a modi￿ed Tobit model. A standard Tobit
model uses the data that have a clear lower bound, but in our dataset, observed interest rates
are not strictly zero due to a term premium. We therefore predetermine a certain positive
bound ￿: When a dependent variable is equal to or lower than ￿; we judge the data as being
constrained by the bound. To see robustness, we try four values of ￿: A dependent variable
is two-year government bond yields over three-month forecast horizon, and an independent
variable is the in￿ ation expectation over next one year.
Here is the Tobit model we use. We begin by neglecting additional non-linearity arising
from the policy commitment. Regarding the policy rate described as
i￿
t = ￿ + ￿￿t + "t; (B.5)
we assume that E
j
















The likelihood that E
j
t [it+k] equals zero is
P(E
j











The likelihood that E
j





























t [it+k] > 0): (B.10)










t [it+k] > ￿); (B.11)
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Table B-5 generally con￿rms our benchmark results. For ￿ around 0.15 percent, we obtain
similar results. The threshold in￿ ation rate is about zero percent. In other words, if the
expected in￿ ation rate is below zero percent, market participants anticipate that the interest
rate continues to be ￿: If the expected in￿ ation rate is above zero percent, market participants
anticipate that the interest rate goes up above ￿: For reference, we also report the results when
￿ is zero. Since all the interest rate forecasts are above zero, all the samples are categorized to
uncensored. Consequently, the estimates are equivalent to those by the standard OLS method.
That clearly creates a bias; for example, the estimated slope ￿ becomes lower.19
Model with Policy Inertia Third, we consider an inertial monetary policy rule. We con-
sider a monetary policy rule with inertia as
i￿
t = ￿it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)fr￿ + ￿￿ + ￿(￿t ￿ ￿￿)g; (B.14)
where ￿ represents the degree of inertia. When ￿ is zero, the policy rule has no inertia, and
results are the same as those in the benchmark.
We here assume that the latent nominal interest rate i￿
t depends on the previous actual
nominal interest rate it￿1: As Reifschneider and Williams (2000) argue, it is probably more
19We also tried to estimate another Tobit model by taking account of uncertainty regarding a threshold
in￿ ation level. However, we could not ￿nd plausible results.
35natural to assume that the latent nominal interest rate i￿
t depends on the previous latent
nominal interest rate i￿
t￿1. We, however, do not adopt the latter rule because it is empirically
di¢ cult to calculate i￿
t￿1.














￿ [￿ + ￿Etit+j￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)fr￿ + ￿￿ + ￿(Et￿t+j ￿ ￿c)g]; (B.15)
where ￿ = ￿+(1￿￿)fr￿+￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿c)g: Due to the assumption of equation (2.5), we require
￿ > ￿: Using the expectations for interest rates and in￿ ation rates at the previous period, the

















t+k￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)fr￿ + ￿￿ + ￿(Et￿1￿t+j ￿ ￿c)g
￿
+ ￿t; (B.16)
where a term ￿t is expressed as (Et￿Et￿1) of endogenous variables. In other words, ￿t rep-
resents unexpected changes in interest rates and in￿ ation rates. When regressing the above
equation, compared with the benchmark, we additionally use the lagged interest rate expecta-
tion, Et￿1iT
t+k￿1; and replace Et￿t+j by the lagged in￿ ation expectation Et￿1￿t+j: We do not
use unobservable ￿t; but estimates are unbiased. This is because other explanatory variables
are the expectations at the previous period t ￿ 1, which are uncorrelated with ￿t that is the
surprise component from t ￿ 1 to t.




















t+j￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
r￿ + ￿￿ + ￿(Et￿1￿t+j ￿ ￿0)
￿￿
+ ￿t: (B.17)
Table B-6 supports our previous ￿ndings, although some of the results are inconsistent
with model prediction. For two-year government bonds, for example, we obtain very high
36policy inertia ￿ = 0:92: The estimated slope ￿ is 1.03, which is above one and satis￿es the
Taylor principle. The threshold in￿ ation rate ￿c is ￿0:21 percent. It is slightly lower than 0.10
percent in the benchmark. A slightly unsatisfactory result is ￿ > ￿;suggesting a reduction in
policy rates when the QEP ends. It may imply that the commitment e⁄ect to continuing low
interest rates after the QEP was very strong. The threshold in￿ ation rate ￿0 is ￿0:50 percent,
which is the minimum in our grid search. Adjusted R2 is signi￿cantly lower according to the
F test, suggesting the selection of the model with the policy commitment.
Model with the Restriction of ￿ = 1:1 Fourth, we restrict the benchmark model with
￿ = 1:1 so that it satis￿es the Taylor principle.
As Table B-7 shows, parameter estimates are similar to those in the benchmark in most
cases. ￿ is greater than ￿ at all the maturities; ￿c is 0.14 percent for three-month TIBOR
and 0.39 percent for two-year government bonds, in particular. The goodness of ￿t worsens
signi￿cantly. At long maturities, adjusted R2 is even negative, and ￿c reaches 0.50, which is
the maximum in our grid search.
B.5 Di⁄erences in Respondents
In the QSS survey, answers vary across respondents. Some respondents report high interest
rate expectations, while others report low interest rate expectations. In Figure 5, for example,
outliers are observed. Also, respondents belong to various institutions and are engaged in
various jobs. Institutions are comprised of securities ￿rms, banks, investment trusts, insurance
￿rms, pension funds, other private ￿nancial institutions, and so on. Jobs are comprised of
investment of their own funds, investment of pension funds, research, and so on.20 Those
di⁄erences possibly yield di⁄erent answers.
To consider the e⁄ects of respondents￿di⁄erences we employ pooled regression by dividing
the sample by the type of respondents. Table B-8 reports estimates, showing that results
are similar to those in the benchmark. The top table suggests that omitting outliers hardly
changes our benchmark results. Here we examine the e⁄ects of outlier respondents by omitting
the samples that are characterized by one-year in￿ ation expectations lower than -1.5 percent
or two-year interest rate expectations higher than 0.75 percent. Next, we divide sample by
respondents￿institutions and jobs. According to the middle and bottom tables, di⁄erences
among respondents are small. In most cases, estimates are similar to those in the benchmark.
The threshold in￿ ation rate ￿0 is zero percent or a little higher. The interest rate intercepts
20In those categories, we cannot tell whether respondents are bond traders or not.
37￿ and ￿ are positive, with ￿ greater than ￿: The slope ￿ is positive except for investment
advisories and pension management.
38Table B-1: Estimation of models with and without the policy commitment
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿c ￿0 Adj R2 F test
TIBOR benchmark 0.093 0.095 0.249 -0.04 ￿ 0.256 0.342
w/o commit 0.093 = ￿ 0.259 ￿ -0.04 0.256
(S.E.) 0.001 ￿ 0.009 ￿ ￿
2Y benchmark 0.118 0.287 0.153 0.10 ￿ 0.413 0.000
w/o commit 0.140 = ￿ 0.395 ￿ -0.05 0.350
(S.E.) 0.002 ￿ 0.010 ￿ ￿
5Y benchmark 0.551 0.757 0.206 0.09 ￿ 0.232 0.000
w/o commit 0.643 = ￿ 0.346 ￿ 0.00 0.198
(S.E.) 0.005 ￿ 0.013 ￿ ￿
10Y benchmark 1.447 1.562 0.054 0.29 ￿ 0.065 0.000
w/o commit 1.479 = ￿ 0.115 ￿ 0.00 0.055
(S.E.) 0.006 ￿ 0.009 ￿ ￿
20Y benchmark 1.896 2.104 0.051 -0.20 ￿ 0.035 0.000
w/o commit 2.096 = ￿ 0.056 ￿ -0.20 0.030
(S.E.) 0.006 ￿ 0.006 ￿ ￿
Note: The sample period is July 2004 to February 2006. Dependent variables are forecasts
over three-month forecast horizon.
39Table B-2: Estimation for the sample periods that include three months
just before and just after the QEP ended
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿c ￿0 Adj R2 F test
TIBOR 0.152 0.302 0.193 0.32 -0.46 0.808 0.000
(S.E.) 0.005 0.003 ￿
2Y 0.349 0.733 0.493 0.50 -0.49 0.608 0.000
(S.E.) 0.007 0.009 ￿
5Y 0.923 1.179 0.328 0.50 -0.49 0.376 0.000
(S.E.) 0.011 0.011 ￿
10Y 1.579 1.707 0.164 0.50 -0.49 0.182 0.000
(S.E.) 0.011 0.009 ￿
20Y 2.116 2.180 0.081 0.50 -0.49 0.080 ￿
(S.E.) 0.011 0.007 ￿
Note: The sample period is December 2005 to February 2006 and August 2006 to October
2006. In the benchmark, we use the model with the policy commitment for the former period
and the model without the policy commitment for the latter period. Dependent variables are
forecasts over three-month forecast horizon.




















TIBOR 0.093 0.101 0.852 0.818 0.095 0.117 0.680 0.707
2Y 0.118 0.163 0.958 0.720 0.287 0.287 0.763 0.910
5Y 0.551 0.675 1.290 1.049 0.757 0.789 1.243 1.309
10Y 1.447 1.512 1.713 1.534 1.562 1.566 1.703 1.796
20Y 1.896 2.123 2.113 2.171 2.104 2.165 2.202 2.230
￿ ￿c
TIBOR 0.249 0.024 0.083 0.074 -0.04 -0.20 0.10 -0.22
2Y 0.153 0.074 -0.014 -0.003 0.10 -0.15 0.40 -0.34
5Y 0.206 0.136 -0.105 0.031 0.09 -0.07 0.40 -0.20
10Y 0.054 0.029 -0.059 -0.009 0.29 0.20 0.48 0.00
20Y 0.051 0.023 0.012 0.013 -0.20 0.30 0.22 0.11
Adj R2
TIBOR 0.256 0.021 0.213 0.103
2Y 0.413 0.180 0.185 0.173
5Y 0.232 0.102 0.052 0.254
10Y 0.065 0.017 0.019 0.275
20Y 0.035 0.017 0.009 0.050
Note: Dependent variables are forecasts over three-month forecast horizon.
41Table B-4: Estimation without term structure consideration
￿ S.E. ￿ S.E. ￿ S.E. ￿c Adj R2
￿1Y ￿e as an explanatory variable ￿
TIBOR 0.094 0.001 0.121 0.002 0.033 0.009 0.10 0.180
2Y 0.151 0.002 0.219 0.005 0.270 0.018 0.01 0.359
5Y 0.663 0.004 0.765 0.008 0.394 0.030 0.01 0.290
10Y 1.436 0.014 1.463 0.006 0.251 0.016 -0.25 0.089
20Y 2.074 0.013 2.124 0.006 0.094 0.016 -0.25 0.022
￿2Y ￿e as an explanatory variable ￿
TIBOR 0.062 0.007 0.082 0.002 0.037 0.002 -0.30 0.099
2Y 0.156 0.003 0.241 0.005 0.063 0.012 0.20 0.216
5Y 0.668 0.004 0.800 0.008 0.089 0.020 0.20 0.187
10Y 1.308 0.026 1.455 0.007 0.148 0.010 -0.30 0.083
20Y 1.951 0.024 2.106 0.006 0.087 0.010 -0.25 0.046
￿10Y ￿e as an explanatory variable ￿
TIBOR 0.094 0.002 0.100 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.40 0.015
2Y 0.176 0.004 0.197 0.004 0.025 0.005 0.50 0.033
5Y 0.689 0.007 0.739 0.007 0.035 0.007 0.50 0.038
10Y 1.498 0.006 1.534 0.006 0.028 0.007 0.50 0.027
20Y 2.114 0.005 2.142 0.006 0.031 0.006 0.50 0.029
Note: Dependent variables are forecasts over three-month forecast horizon.
42Table B-5: Estimation of the Tobit model using 1Y ￿e as an explanatory variable
￿ (preset)
[#N, #N]
￿ S.E. ￿ S.E. ￿" S.E.
￿c=
(￿ ￿ ￿)=￿
0 0.191 0.002 0.299 0.005 0.096 0.001 -0.64
[0, 2096]
2Y 0.10 0.173 0.002 0.353 0.006 0.113 0.001 -0.21
[413, 1683]
0.15 0.136 0.003 0.453 0.009 0.138 0.002 0.03
[919, 1177]
0.20 0.100 0.005 0.575 0.017 0.150 0.003 0.17
[1242, 854]
Note: Two ￿gures in a square bracket [ , ] indicate the number of samples where the
dependent variable is equal or lower than ￿ and higher than ￿; respectively. When ￿ is zero,
the esimation is equivalent to simple linear regression because all the dependent variables are
above zero due to a term premium. Dependent variables are forecasts over three-month
forecast horizon.
43Table B-6: Estimation of models with policy inertia
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿c ￿0 Adj R2 F test
TIBOR w commit 0.088 0.019 0.288 0.728 -0.24 0.440 0.000
(S.E.) 0.002 0.002 0.028 0.025
w/o commit 0.008 = ￿ 0.227 0.717 ￿ -0.48 0.434
(S.E.) 0.002 ￿ 0.021 0.024 ￿ ￿
2Y w commit 0.111 0.007 1.026 0.922 -0.21 0.702 0.000
(S.E.) 0.007 0.003 0.184 0.016
w/o commit -0.012 = ￿ 0.857 0.913 ￿ -0.50 0.694
(S.E.) 0.004 ￿ 0.135 0.016 ￿ ￿
5Y w commit 0.570 0.108 0.128 0.891 -0.01 0.642 0.000
(S.E.) 0.010 0.012 0.110 0.016
w/o commit 0.108 = ￿ 0.306 0.804 ￿ -0.50 0.624
(S.E.) 0.010 ￿ 0.046 0.014 ￿ ￿
10Y w commit 1.229 0.595 0.061 0.597 -0.21 0.448 0.000
(S.E.) 0.035 0.022 0.017 0.014
w/o commit 0.658 = ￿ 0.058 0.549 ￿ -0.50 0.420
(S.E.) 0.021 ￿ 0.015 0.014 ￿ ￿
20Y w commit 1.896 0.969 0.012 0.541 -0.21 0.361 0.000
(S.E.) 0.043 0.032 0.011 0.015
w/o commit 1.207 = ￿ 0.010 0.430 ￿ -0.50 0.301
(S.E.) 0.029 ￿ 0.009 0.014 ￿ ￿
Note: Dependent variables are forecasts over three-month forecast horizon.
44Table B-7: Estimation with restriction ￿ = 1:1
￿ ￿ ￿c Adj R2
TIBOR 0.099 0.199 0.14 0.117
(S.E.) 0.001 0.003
2Y 0.180 0.433 0.39 0.078
(S.E.) 0.002 0.009
5Y 0.704 1.359 0.50 -0.070
(S.E.) 0.005 0.010
10Y 1.558 2.695 0.50 -1.095
(S.E.) 0.008 0.009
20Y 2.176 3.713 0.50 -4.133
(S.E.) 0.012 0.010
Note: Dependent variables are forecasts over three-month forecast horizon.
45Table B-8: Estimation omitting outliers and dividing respondents
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿c Adj R2 ] N
Omitting Outliers
2Y 3M 0.118 0.286 0.152 0.10 0.425 2,871
(S.E.) 0.003 0.005 0.019
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿c Adj R2 ] N
Institution
Security Firm (domestic) 0.110 0.315 0.154 0.10 0.480 407
(S.E.) 0.008 0.014 0.053
Security Firm (foreign) 0.125 0.249 0.293 0.09 0.494 151
(S.E.) 0.009 0.022 0.092
Investment Trust 0.125 0.275 0.164 0.10 0.370 715
(S.E.) 0.006 0.012 0.041
Investment Advisory 0.103 0.295 -0.033 0.12 0.217 126
(S.E.) 0.020 0.031 0.109
Bank 0.114 0.287 0.110 0.10 0.415 809
(S.E.) 0.005 0.009 0.035
Trust Bank 0.118 0.184 0.459 0.00 0.427 235
(S.E.) 0.014 0.020 0.071
Insurance Firm 0.122 0.310 0.063 0.10 0.410 233
(S.E.) 0.009 0.018 0.062
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿c Adj R2 ] N
Job
Treasury Management 0.118 0.282 0.152 0.10 0.403 958
(S.E.) 0.005 0.009 0.033
Pension Management 0.129 0.378 -0.191 0.17 0.335 366
(S.E.) 0.007 0.020 0.075
Research 0.112 0.261 0.189 0.09 0.461 260
(S.E.) 0.007 0.016 0.061
Note: Dependent variables are forecasts of two-year bond over three-month forecast horizon,
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Figure A-1: Three-month TIBOR rate expectations (top: means;
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Figure A-2: Two-year JGB rate expectations (top: means; middle:









































































Cor e CPI( % )
Figure A-3: Five-year JGB rate expectations (top: means; middle: standard
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Figure A-4: Ten-year JGB rate expectations (top: means; middle:
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Figure A-5: 20-year JGB rate expectations (top: means; middle: standard
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Figure A-6: In￿ ation expectations (top: means; middle: standard
deviations; bottom: skewness)




















































































Figure A-7: Interest rate expectations vis-a-vis two-year in￿ ation expectations




















































































Figure A-8: Interest rate expectations vis-a-vis ten-year in￿ ation expectations

















































































































































































































































Figure B-1: Interest rate expectations vis-a-vis one-year in￿ ation expectations in the short
period just before and just after the QEP ended
Note: A blue circle (o) indicates a sample from December 2005 to February 2006, a red dot
(￿) indicates a sample from April 2006 to June 2006, and a green plus (+) indicates a sample
from August 2006 to October 2006.




















































































Figure B-2: Interest rate expectations vis-a-vis one-year in￿ ation expectations excluding food
and energy during the QEP























































































Figure B-3: Interest rate expectations vis-a-vis one-year in￿ ation expectations excluding food
and energy after the QEP ended
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